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1. INTRODUCTION 
Users of bibliographic databases are nowadays confronted with 
a variety of restrictions on the use made of the search results, 
much more so than ever existed for printed bibliographies. There 
are at least three reasons for these restrictions: 
a. new modes of co-operation in input creation, 
b. economics, including hedging against uncertainties of the 
future, and 
c. administrative control. 
Restrictions in database use which are a side-effect of 
input co-operation are due to the fact that for several databases 
resulting from such co-operation, the access is limited to those 
who contribute input to the system. 
The economic motives for restrictions are generally based 
on the premise, that such restrictions will increase total net 
income. They at least give the database producer the security 
that little potential, but not yet foreseen, income is lost. It 
seems a typical result of the present uncertainties about future 
demand in relation to price and to independent developments over 
time. 
Finally, database producers require all kinds of infor­
mation on the use made of their database, which can become very 
burdensome to the user. 
In de paper before you, I will examine each of these 
restrictions, thereby considering their possible effects on the 
use of information and on the extent to which they help the data­
base producer to maintain the coverage and quality of his data­
base . 
I have not done any extended research to back up my con­
tentions with quantitative data. The databases mentioned are 
only meant as examples.This first introduction will hopefully 
lead the way to an in-depth analysis of all the existing 
restrictions with which the database producers confront their 
users. 
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2. INPUT CO-OPERATION 
When a group of private companies bands together to make 
a tool for their common use, and do not make it available to out­
siders, one generally does not hear any opposition. Other parties 
might be very interested in acquiring it, but the exclusive 
rights of the group have to be respected. In-house developed tools 
are often the key to the success of a company. 
The RING-DOC database is an example of a co­
operative information system, set up by a group of pharmaceutical 
industries, available only to the participants and generally not 
to outsiders. It is conceivable that a national public institution 
sets up a data base that is only available to citizens of that 
particular country and not to others, but I do not know of -such 
an example. However, there are more and more data bases produced 
by a co-operative effort of groups of countries, to which only 
participating countries have access. A good example is the 
Energy Data base of the U.S. Department of Energy (USDE), which 
is only accessible to countries who contribute input, such as 
the German Federal Republic, but not to a non-contributor like 
the Netherlands. It is not even possible to buy yourself in; 
actual input is your only entrance ticket. The present position 
of USDE may well make it impossible to access the data base 
through EURONET, even though it is loaded on an EURONET host 
computer. The principle of free flow of information is certainly 
violated by such a stipulation! 
Already alternative arrangements have been worked out 
whereby the users share the burden of the input in some way, with­
out too heavy restrictions on the freedom of information: 
By contract NASA requires individual users of its STAR 
system outside the U.S.,to provide an average of one input record 
for each hour of online data base use. This requirement rests on 
the reasonable assumption that anyone who needs the data base 
will eventually publish something of interest to the data base. 
The advantage of this regulation to the USDE regulation is that 
there is no set-up of any national input organization involved, 
which often is a lengthy process involving political decisions. 
Once institutions are co-operating with a data base producer, it 
may then become attractive to pool the efforts and set up a 
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national organization as a second phase. But at least one does 
not have to wait for it. 
The US National Library of Medicine (NLM) has another option: 
apart from obtaining access by agreeing to provide a minimum 
amount of input, countries can also use the data base by paying 
an annual lump sum. Countries that have obtained an agreement with 
the NLM can then themselves grant access to the data base to third 
countries on their own terms and compete for clients from those 
countries. With such a regulation, contributions in money can be 
substituted for contributions in kind. Thus, access is generally 
more free, as two possibilities are better than one: countries 
that, for whatever reason, cannot provide input in kind but that 
do have some money, are no longer excluded from access, either 
by buying themselves in or by using the services of other 
countries. 
The NLM has promoted the regional accessibility of its 
data base as participating countries were generally not allowed 
to access the NLM computer, but had to process the tapes them­
selves. This was also prompted by the fear of an overload on the 
NLM computer. The fact that a private firm in de US like 
Bibliographical Retrieval Services (BRS) is not allowed to sell 
its Medline service outside the US is still being challenged. 
Whether or not monetary contributions can replace input 
in kind, depends on the type of documents involved. If the majority 
of documents is to be found in well known published journals, 
central acquisition and input should pose no great problems. How­
ever, if non-conventional documents form a potentially important 
part of the data base, good coverage may well be only achievable 
through local acquisition. Locally acquired documents can either 
be sent to a central place for input or be inputted locally. For 
financing decentralized input there are also two possibilities, 
either b^ local funds or from a central budget. 
Apart from information systems with its input-output 
system dictated by one country, there are truly international 
systems, which are run by an international agency controlled by 
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all co-operating countries. INIS and AGRIS are here the well 
known examples. In these systems output use is also restricted 
to participating countries, but practically all countries that 
are interested in the information can obtain access to it because 
they already participate in the input. Otherwise they can at 
least purchase the printed version. Because more or less parallel 
data bases with general access already existed when INIS and 
AGRIS started, no one was ever really excluded from information 
within the scope of these data bases. 
Thus, while an input-output stipulation quid pro quo can 
be an effective way to pressure countries and individuals to 
co-operate in input, one should carefully weigh the disadvantages 
of restricting use to various groups of potential users. Differ­
ent stages in the development of an information infrastructure 
may well require different solutions. The widest possible use of 
the collected information should remain the ultimate goal, at 
least where public funds are involved. 
There does exist a different type of use restriction to 
INIS caused by its typical co-operative structure: the control 
over output use within a given country by the INIS liaison 
officer for that country. Each participating country has the 
right to restrict the use of the data base to particular users, 
for whatever reason. 
For AGRIS such far-reaching controls over information use 
within a particular country have not yet been established. How­
ever, there is at present a proposal before the UNESCO to grant 
each country the right to control all information, that is 
offered from the outside. If this proposition is accepted, it 
seems to be the death warrant for the freedom of information 
policy. 
3. ECONOMIC CONSIDERATIONS 
The most important motive for restrictions in the use of 
data bases may well be economic. It seems impossible to define 
a common goal for all data base producers, but apart from those 
that are mainly financed from public funds, most data base 
producers need at least to balance their costs with income from 
sales, with preferably some excess for the development of better 
- 5 
services in the future. Purely private ventures may just want to 
maximize profits. 
The data base producing industry has thereby to cope with 
an almost complete lack of reliable information on future market 
behaviour with regard to the effects of pricing policies on 
future income. This uncertainty, together with todays mostly un­
favourable economic conditions and the new technological possibi­
lities for copying records, have created a true labyrinth of 
pricing and usage conditions. The simple contrast with the easy 
life of annual subscriptions to printed journals without strings 
attached is quite harsh! 
The arrangements in use at present can be divided into 
three classes: 
a. Flat fee 
You pay a flat fee which grants you the right to use the 
file for whatever lawful pursuits. Examples: Biosis, Agricola. 
b. Flat fee with restrictions 
A flat fee entitles you to use the file for a restricted 
group of clients. 
c. Payment per record addressed or printed 
Everytime you address or print a record from the file, you 
pay a royalty. The fee is thus in linear proportion to the use made 
of the data base. Sometimes arrangements of this type require 
also a flat fee and may also carry restrictions with regard to 
the group of clients. 
In this presentation, only the restrictions concern us: 
Unrestricted payment per record accessed, does not discriminate 
against either the small or the big user. 
The unrestricted flat fee may be in reality quite 
restrictive, if the fee is excessively high. This may clearly 
prevent small users from processing the file themselves. 
Since most data bases are unique, we are mainly concerned 
with the economic theory of monopoly. In a monopolistic market, 
it is the relation between price and demand volume that determines 
income, and from which maximum income can be derived. Table 1 
gives a hypothetical example. 
Table 1. Hypothetical relation between the price of a tape, the number of 
tapes sold and the total revenue earned from sales. 



























With some modifications as to its scale the example may 
well be applicable to several real-life cases. It shows that 
initially, revenue increases with increasing price, but after a 
stretch of indifference, higher prices eventually decrease total 
revenue, unless there is a single buyer who wants the product 
almost at any cost. In this example, the revenue is the same at 
a sales volume of 1, 4 and 8 tapes sold. I would hope that in 
such a case the producer would want to maximize the spread 
information and sell 8 tapes at $5000 instead of 4 at $10,000 
each and certainly not just one at $40,000! 
The main advantage of the flat-fee arrangement over the 
royalty payment per record accessed or printed is the ease in 
administration and the predictability of income for the producer 
and costs for the user. Computer accounting relieves this burden 
at least partially, but the fact that almost any data base needs 
its own accounting programme is still quite burdensome. 
The restrictions with an economic motive are generally 
meant to increase revenue through market segmentation: by limiting 
the use of a tape to a well-defined user group, it is hoped that 
another tape can be sold to potential users outside that group. 
This is a well known device to monopolists for increasing their 
revenue. However, with regard to the principle of ensured access 
of information for all, it poses some problems: If usage rights 
are only sold to well defined groups, where does a potential client 
go,- who does not belong to a group with operational usage provisions 
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The data base producer will probably say: this is a special case, 
for which a special solution can be found. But active marketing 
for the clientele of special cases is generally not allowed, so 
that these markets remain underdeveloped. The arrangement made 
between my own institution, the Centre for Agricultural Publishing 
and Documentation (Pudoc) and the Commonwealth Agricultural Bureau 
(CAB) is a good example: we may offer SDI services on the CAB file 
within the Netherlands; however, to provide these services outside 
our country we must obtain prior approval for each customer. Becau 
this is in practice quite unworkable, we came to a tacit agreement 
that regular submission of clients lists would suffice for the 
time being. Although we do have a number of foreign clients, it 
is quite likely that we would have many more, if active marketing 
in other countries was allowed. At present, we are the only one 
offering SDI services on CAB within the countries of the European 
Communities, so at the moment CAB is not gaining any income from 
restricting our rights. Market restrictions cannot only limit the 
number of final users to an important extent, they can also con­
siderably limit the net income of intermediaries without providing 
extra income for the producer. 
Restriction of clientele to a particular group does often 
- although not necessarily - entail also exclusive rights for that 
group. The reason for exclusive rights is generally that once you 
are restricted to a relatively small group of potential users, you 
should be able to utilize the potential of that market to its 
utmost. Interference of others in your small market may make your 
operation totally impossible. One might think that the single 
minded monopolist should strive for the largest number of separate 
markets, keeping them all as small as possible. However, as the 
example in Table 1 has illustrated, this is not necessarily true. 
It all depends on the shape of the demand curve. In that particula 
example, selling 8 tapes was more profitable than selling 10. 
Exclusive rights can also be defended as a temporary 
measure for infant industries: new set-ups should have some period 
of protection from fierce competition to get themselves going. Thi 
argument is often used to defend high import duties in a developin 
country which is trying to set up its own industry in competition 
with well-established imports. 
Finally, as exclusive rights prevent all competition, any 
pressure for improvements in quality of the service or for lower 
prices, should come from elsewhere. 
The restrictive clause that use should be limited to the 
existing clientele group implies that the data base producer 
freezes the clientele group of the intermediary at the moment the 
contract is signed. Such a stipulation effectively frustrates any 
dynamism in market development that an intermediary may have, and 
is especially difficult to accept if you have to leave potential 
clients in the cold or have to send them to another outfit with 
higher prices or a less good service. 
Apart from the use made of bibliographic data bases within 
large companies, I really do not see how market restrictions can 
be well defended. There is always an equilibrium price for royalties 
per record accessed or printed, at which the net revenue for the 
data base producer is the same as under restrictive marketing 
arrangements with flat fees. The royalty arrangement has the ad­
vantage that it can allow unlimited marketing and competition. It 
is my contention that exclusive rights for some user group outside 
a company or similar unit should be granted for a limited period 
only under the 'infant industry' argument. 
Other economic restrictions. 
To finish this section I will deal briefly with high treshhold 
fees and with restrictions on use of output from the data base. 
a. High threshhold fees 
The justification for high threshhold fees for accessing 
online data bases may be that the data base producer wants some 
basic secure income to cover his set-up costs and the initial 
costs that each new user incurs, even without using the data base 
at all, as he needs manuals, training etc. However, the height of 
these fees may well discourage quite a few potential small-time 
users, which could all together imply quite a loss of potential in­
come. A compromise is for example practiced by Predicast Inc., 
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whereby big users pay a flat fee plus a relatively low royalty 
per record accessed and small users pay a higher unit cost without 
a flat fee. 
Compulsory subscription to the parallel printed version 
is another form of a high threshhold fee. It is a safe method for 
data base producers not to lose any subscription fees from the 
printed version by making the machine-readable version available. 
It illustrates the complete lack of information on the conditions 
that govern income formation once the tape starts competing with 
the printed version. However, such compulsory subscriptions are 
only acceptable in the initial stage of growth. They should be 
replaced by a more equitable type of contract as soon as the 
data base producer has enough experience for reasonably reliable 
forecasts. As long as compulsory subscriptions are in force, 
conjunctions between libraries and information centres should be 
allowed so that an information centre can subscribe to the tape 
on the subscription of a co-operating library. Otherwise, infor­
mation centres are forced to buy printed versions only to dump 
them as waste paper: a considerable extra cost for a sometimes 
meaningless benefit. 
b. Restrictions in the use of output 
It is logical that one is not allowed to sell copies of 
a bought or leased tape, were it only for copyright reasons. As 
for restrictions on reproduction or re-use of parts of the data 
base, say the results of one search, there is less statute law to 
go by. It is good to realize that the monopolistic seller can in­
clude any restriction he wants to in a contract and require you 
to sign, the alternative being that you are not granted permission 
to use the data base at all. All such contracts signed by both 
parties are valid under most national laws. So a user can only 
plead with the producer: please do not make my life too difficult, 
I am after all helping to distribute your product and please con­
sider carefully whether your restrictions indeed bring you non-
negligible profits; these should be more than a theoretical 
possibility or a vain hope. The situation that emerges resembles 
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the relation between a slave driver and his slaves: the master 
keeps his slaves just in good enough condition to work well for 
him, with all the profits for the master and no gains for the 
slave. The (semi-)commercial user may even be worse off than a 
slave because a slave had security and a data base user is 
generally out on his own. 
We are often faced with restrictions on selling or even 
mere reproduction of extra copies of one search result and in­
corporating search results into other products, which are then 
multiplied and sold. If the contract is of the royalty-per-record-
printed type, then it is quite clear that copying search results 
without paying extra royalties means lost income for the data base 
producer. If there is no royalty paid per item, such a restriction 
does not seem to have a valid basis. Incorporation of search re­
sults into new products presents many complications. One can buy 
many bibliographies that are compiled from a large variety of 
sources probably including computer-readable data bases without 
an indication of the secondary source of the references. One can­
not even trace whether a secondary source has been used at all; 
the compiler may have used the original document, and titles of 
original documents are not subject to copyright. Thus, even though 
data base producers may want a share in the sale from tertiary 
bibliographies, they cannot prove that they have been used, so 
they will never have a case. 
Re-use of abstracts is slightly different and as yet un­
settled. Abstracts can be copyrighted. Author's abstracts present 
a problem, because it is not clear how a secondary service can 
claim copyright, unless the service has specifically obtained this 
right from the original author. 
Copyright can also interfere considerably with attempts 
to merge parts of data bases into a new data base. The regulations 
worked out for TOXLINE are quite intricate; they donot especially 
encourage new ventures in this direction, although the need for 
repackaged data bases seems very large. More experience with con­
tractual forms seems necessary before the situation becomes 
easier. A report on these aspects of the TOXLINE experience would 
be quite helpful! 
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A final restriction is one put on the place where the 
output is used. Output from Chemical Abstracts can, for example, 
not be used off the premises where it was sent to, without special 
permission. This stipulation seems quite unenforceable, but it 
illustrates again the care that data base producers take not to 
lose any possible potential income. 
In general, all the mentioned restrictions can be bought-
off by a special contract. However, the number of special contracts 
that an intermediary, working for a variety of clients off his 
premisses and making various repackaged information products, may 
well become a manager's nightmare. 
4. NON-ECONOMIC REASONS : CONTROL 
Some restrictions without a purely economic justification 
have already been mentioned in the section on input co-operation. 
In this section I will briefly deal with administrative require­
ments, which can become quite restrictive through the amount of 
work involved. Some data base producers want to be informed con­
tinuously on who uses their data base and with what intensity. 
Such information may well be used for the benefit of the user, but 
it can also entangle him in many administrative procedures. For 
example CAB requires regularly address lists of all SDI clients 
which takes quite some secretarial staff time especially if these 
files are not yet computerized. For ENVIROLINE it is stated in 
the Lockheed agreement that a special license for redistribution 
of search results is needed, and that such a license can be ob­
tained at no cost. There is no economic motive therefore but 
purely an administrative control over use. The same applies at the 
moment for INIS and AGRIS in most countries. 
At first sight it would seem simple to comply with such 
a request: just write a letter, explain your honest business, and 
you will probably receive a free license. The problems arise only 
gradually, when you have to ask for different usage rights from 
more and more data bases and you get entangled in administrative 
procedures. The officers of the Netherlands online users group 
discussed recently the possible functions of a national service 
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bureau for online information retrieval. One of the tasks of such 
a bureau would be to help local information centres in obtaining 
such licenses: let the information centres tell the service bureau 
which data bases it wants access to and what use it wants to 
make of the results and let the service bureau as a trustee arrange 
for all the network and host passwords as well as for all the 
licenses. Such a service has become a virtual necessity as all the 
combined data base producers, spinners and networks want to drown 
us in administrative procedures, however benevolently. We will be 
suffocated by their embrace. 
5. CONCLUSIONS 
All the different contractual arrangements that exist at 
present, with the miriad of different restrictions imposed on the 
user may well be a natural phenomenon of the early stages of fast 
growth of a new industry. As experience is built up, I expect 
that only a few types of contracts will eventually remain in 
practice. Different data bases and their clientele are after all 
not as unique as they may seem to the producer. 
In the mean time, EUSIDIC could help to speed up the pro­
cess of normalization by working out some model contracts in co­
operation with both the producers and the users. 
While writing this paper, I became more and more con­
vinced that probably just two types of contract are sufficient: 
one for within-company use with a lump sum, and one for inter­
mediaries with a royalty-per-item-accessed-or-printed. The latter 
does not need any user group or geographical restrictions, because 
such restrictions will never increase the total use made of the 
file. Such a regulation does not discriminate against the small 
user and it gives the big user at least some economies of scale 
because he can keep any gains from decreasing overhead per unit 
for himself. 
Although I think that two types of contract may well be 
sufficient, there is a Dutch proverb that says: most good things 
come in threes, thus, probably at least a third type will be 
needed as well. The only thing that cannot be so easily resolved 
are requirements for input co-operation. In some cases such re­
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quirements can be quite reasonable. However, one has to consider 
seriously whether it is inevitable to exclude certain groups of 
users, for whom input co-operation is beyond their means or out­
side their organizational power, or who may just not have anything 
to offer, even though the use of the data base may be very 
valuable to them. 
May I end with expressing the hope that EUSIDIC will help 
to bring some order in the present labyrinth, thereby preserving 
the income of its producer members, and improving the freedom to 
use information for its user members. 
